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Abstract. We present a new notion called the attribute-based signature with message recovery. Compared with the existing attribute-based
signature schemes, an attribute-based signature with message recovery
scheme does not require transmission of the original message to verify
the validity of the signature, since the original message can be recovered
from the signature. Therefore, this scheme shortens the total length of
the original message and the appended attribute-based signature. The
contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we introduce the notion
of attribute-based signature with message recovery. Second, we present
a concrete construction of an attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme based on bilinear pairing. Finally, we extend our scheme to
deal with large messages. The proposed schemes support flexible threshold predicates and are proven to be existentially unforgeable against
adaptively chosen message attacks in the random oracle model under
the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
We demonstrate that the proposed schemes are also equipped with the
attribute privacy property.

Keywords: Signature, Attribute-Based Signature, Message Recovery
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Introduction

Essentially, there are two general classes of digital signature schemes. Signature
schemes with appendix require the original message as input to the verification
algorithm. Signature schemes with message recovery do not require the original
message as input to the verification algorithm. In networks with limited bandwidth and lightweight mobile devices, long digital signatures will obviously be
a drawback. Apart from shortening the signature itself, the other effective approach for saving bandwidth is to eliminate the requirement of transmitting the
signed original message for the sake of verifying the attached digital signature.
In this work, we consider the latter approach. In signature schemes with message
recovery, all or part of the original message is embedded within the signature and
can be recovered from the signature itself. It is somewhat related to the problem
of signing short messages using a scheme that minimizes the total length of the
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original message and the appended signature, and hence it is useful in an organization where bandwidth is one of the main concerns and useful for applications
in which short messages should be signed.
An attribute-based signature is an elaborated cryptographic notion that supports fine-grain access control in anonymous authentication systems. A related
approach, but much simpler, to an attribute-based signature is identity-based
signature. Compared with an identity-based signature in which a single string
representing the signer’s identity, in an attribute-based signature, a signer who
obtains a certificate for a set of attributes from the attribute authority is defined
by a set of attributes. An attribute-based signature attests not to the identity of
the individual who signed a message, but assures the verifier that a signer whose
set of attributes satisfies a predicate has endorsed the message. In an attributebased signature, the signature reveals no more than the fact that a single user
with some set of attributes satisfying the predicate has attested to the message.
In particular, the signature hides the attributes used to satisfy the predicate and
any identifying information about the signer. Furthermore, users cannot collude
to pool their attributes together.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we introduce the notion of attribute-based
signature with message recovery. This notion allows fine-grain access control
as well as enjoys the shortness of message-signature length. We propose two
efficient schemes supporting flexible threshold predicate. The first one embeds
short original message in the signature and it will be recovered in the process of
verification, while keeping the signature size the same as existing scheme which
requires transmission of the original message to verify the signature. For large
messages, the second scheme separates the original message to two parts. The
signature is appended to a truncated message and the discarded bytes can be
recovered by the verification algorithm. The security of our schemes are proven
to be existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks in the
random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard. These
schemes are also equipped with attribute-privacy property.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
2, we introduce some related work that has been studied in the literature. In Section 3, we introduce some preliminaries used throughout this paper. In Section 4,
we propose a notion of attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme
and present a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing. We also present a security model and security proofs about existential unforgeability against adaptively
chosen message attacks and attribute-privacy property. We also extend the first
scheme in order to deal with large messages. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2

Related Work

Attribute-based signatures extend the identity-based signature of Shamir [11] by
allowing the identity of a signer to be a set of descriptive attributes rather than
a single string. As a related notion to attribute-based signature, fuzzy identitybased signature was proposed and formalized in [13], which enables users to
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generate signatures with part of their attributes. An attribute-based signature
was also proposed in [12], to achieve almost the same goal. However, these kinds
of signatures do not consider the anonymity for signers. Khader [3, 2] proposed a
notion called attribute-based group signatures. This primitive hides the identity
of the signer, but reveals which attributes the signer used to satisfy the predicate. It also allows a group manager to identify the signer of any signature. In
Khader [4] and Maji et al. [7, 8], they treated attribute-privacy as a fundamental
requirement of attribute-based signatures.
Maji et al. [7] constructed an attribute-based signature scheme that supports a powerful set of predicates, namely, any predicate consists of AND, OR
and Threshold gates. However, their construction is only proved in the generic
group model. Li and Kim [6] first proposed an attribute-based signature scheme
that is secure under the standard CDH assumption. Their scheme only considered (n, n)-threshold, where n is the number of attributes purported in the
signature. Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [10] extended Li and Kim’s scheme [6]
and presented an attribute-based signature scheme supporting (k, n)-threshold.
Li et al. [5] explored a new signing technique integrating all the secret attributes
components into one. Their constructions provide better efficiency in terms of
both the computational cost and signature size.
In order to minimize the total length of the original message and the appended signature, message recovery schemes were introduced (e.g. [9]). Zhang et
al. [14] presented the seminal construction of an identity-based message recovery
signature scheme. Inspired by the schemes due to Zhang et al. [14] and Li et al.
[5], we propose our attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme.
Comparison As we have mentioned above, the scheme of Li et al. [5] have
improved schemes of [6, 10] to provide better efficiency in terms of both the
computational cost and signature size. Compared with the scheme of Li et al.
[5] which requires transmission of the original message, our scheme embeds the
original message in the signature while keeping the signature size same as that of
[5]. We also note that Gagné et al. [1] proposed a new threshold attribute-based
signature scheme which they claimed the signature size is independent of the
number of attributes. However, this result is restricted only to a very special
(t, t) threshold scenario. For general attribute policies such as (t, n) threshold
scenario, the signature size still grows linearly with the number of attributes
used to generate the signature. Furthermore, the scheme of Gagné et al. [1] only
deals with fixed threshold. While our scheme can deal with flexible threshold
from 1 to d which is predefined in the setup step.

3
3.1

Preliminaries
Lagrange Interpolation

Given d points q(1), · · · , q(d) on a d − 1 degree polynomial, let S be this delement set. The Lagrange coefficient ∆j,S (i) of q(j) in the computation of q(i)
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is:
∆j,S (i) =

Y
η∈S,η6=j

i−η
j−η

We can use Lagrange interpolation to compute q(i) for any i ∈ Zp .
3.2

Bilinear Pairing

Let G1 be a cyclic additive group whose order is a prime p. Let G2 be a cyclic
multiplicative group with the same order p. Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear
mapping with the following properties:
– Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all {P, Q} ∈ G1 , {a, b} ∈ Zq .
– Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1 such that ê(P, P ) 6= 1.
– Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all
{P, Q} ∈ G1 .
3.3

CDH Problem

Let G1 be a group of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G1 . Let A be an
attacker. A tries to solve the following problem: Given (g, g a , g b ) for some
unknown a, b ∈ Z∗p , compute g ab .
The CDH problem is said to be intractable, if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the success probability is negligible.

4
4.1

Attribute-Based Signature with Message Recovery
Definitions

We assume there is a universal set of attributes U . Each signer is associated
with a subset ω ⊂ U of attributes that is verified by an attribute authority. Our
scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
Setup: On input of a security parameter, this algorithm selects the master secret
key and generates the corresponding public key.
Extract: When a party requires its attribute private key {Di }i∈ω corresponding
to an attribute set ω, this algorithm generates the attribute private key using the
master key and attributes in ω if he is eligible to be issued with these attributes.
Sign: This scheme supports all predicates Υt,ω̄ (·) → 0/1 consisting of t out of
n threshold gates, in which ω̄ is an n-element attribute set with threshold value
t flexible from 1 to d where Υt,ω̄ (ω) = 1 when |ω ∩ ω̄| ≥ t. On input a message
m, a predicate Υt,ω̄ (·) → 0/1, and a sender’s private key {Di }i∈ω , this algorithm
generates a signature σ when |ω ∩ ω̄| ≥ t.
Verify: When receiving a signature σ and a predicate Υt,ω̄ (·) → 0/1, this algorithm checks whether the signature is valid corresponding to the predicate
Υt,ω̄ (·) → 0/1. If the signature σ is valid, this algorithm recovers the original
message m.

Attribute-Based Signature with Message Recovery
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Our Scheme

Setup: First, define the attributes in universe U as elements in Z∗p where p
is a sufficient large prime. A (d − 1) default attribute set from Z∗p is given as
Ω = {Ω1 , Ω2 , · · · , Ωd−1 }. Select a random generator g ∈ G1 , a random x ∈ Z∗p ,
and set g1 = g x . Next, pick a random element g2 ∈ G1 . Five hash functions are
also chosen such that H1 : Z∗p → G1 , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
F1 : {0, 1}k2 → {0, 1}k1 , F2 : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2 . The public parameters are
params = (g, g1 , g2 , d, H1 , H2 , H3 , F1 , F2 ), the master secret key is x.
Extract: To generate private key for an attribute set ω,
– First, randomly choose a (d − 1) degree polynomial q(z) such that q(0) = x;
– Generate a new attribute set ω̂ = ω ∪ Ω. For each i ∈ ω̂, choose ri ∈R Zp
q(i)
and compute di0 = g2 · H1 (i)ri and di1 = g ri ;
– Finally, output Di = (di0 , di1 ) as the private key for each i ∈ ω̂.
Sign: Suppose one has private key for the attribute set ω. To sign a message
m which length is equal to k2 with predicate Υt,ω̄ (·), namely, to prove owning
at least t attributes among an n-element attribute set ω̄, he selects a t-element
subset ω 0 ⊆ ω ∩ ω̄ and selects randomly an element j from subset ω̄/ω 0 , and
proceeds as follows:
– First, select a default attribute subset Ω 0 ⊆ Ω with |Ω 0 | = d − t and choose
(n + d − t − 1) random values ri0 ∈ Z∗p for i ∈ (ω̄/j) ∪ Ω 0 , choose a random
value s ∈ Z∗p ;
– Compute v = e(g1 , g2 );
– Compute f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m);
– Compute r = H2 (v) + f ;
0
∆ (0)
– Compute σi = di1i,S · g ri for i ∈ ω 0 ∪ Ω 0 ;
0
– Compute σi = g ri for i ∈ ω̄/(ω 0 ∪ j);
s
– Compute σj = gh ;
i hQ
i
Q
∆i,S (0)
ri0
H
(i)
d
·
– Compute σ0 =
0
0
0
1
i∈(ω̄∪Ω )/j
i∈ω ∪Ω i0
s
· H1 (j) · H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ) ;
– Finally, output the signature σ = (r, σ0 , {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ).
To sign a message m which length is shorter than k2 , one can just pad spaces
after the message until k2 .
Verify: To verify the validity of a signature σ = (r, σ0 , {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ) with
threshold t for attributes ω̄, the verifier performs the following verification procedure to recover the message m:
e (g, σ0 )
 = v
e
(H
(i),
σ
)
·
e
σj , H3 r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj
1
i
i∈ω̄∪Ω 0

Q

r − H2 (v) = f.
k1

Then, m = [f ]k2 ⊕ F2 ([f ] ) is recovered from f . The verifier checks whether the
equation [f ]k1 = F1 (m) holds. If it holds, output accept and the message m is
recovered. Otherwise, output reject to denote the signature is not valid.
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In the above computation, the subscript k2 of f denotes the least significant
k2 bits of f , and the superscript k1 of f denotes the most significant k1 bits of
f.
4.3

Security model

Existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks.
It can be defined using a game between an adversary and a challenger.
The adversary A knows the public key of the signer. Its goal is to forge a valid
signature of a message m∗ with a predicate Υt,ω̄ (·) → 0/1 that his attributes do
not satisfy.
Firstly, challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to get the master secret key
with respect to a security parameter and the system’s public parameters params.
Then, C sends params to adversary A. A can access polynomially bounded
number of the following oracles.
H1 Oracle: For H1 hash query with respect to an attribute i ∈ Z∗p , C returns a
hash value H1 (i) ∈R G1 corresponding to the attribute i.
H3 Oracle: For H3 hash query with respect to a tuple (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )
in which the first r ∈ Z∗p and the rest elements all come from group G1 , C
returns a hash value H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ) ∈R G1 corresponding to the tuple
(r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ).
Extract Oracle: For Extract query with respect to an attribute set ω such that
|ω̄ ∩ω| < t, C returns Di = (di0 , di1 ) for each i ∈ ω as the private key of attribute
set ω.
Sign Oracle: For Sign query on arbitrary designated attribute set ω and arbitrary message m, C returns a valid signature σ with respect to m on behalf of
the designated signer who possesses the attribute set ω.
Output: A outputs an alleged signature σ ∗ on message m∗ on behalf of a user
who possesses an attribute set ω ∗ such that |ω̄ ∩ ω ∗ | ≥ t. If no Sign queries of
message m∗ with an attribute set ω such that |ω̄ ∩ ω| ≥ t and no Extract queries
with respect to an attribute set ω such that |ω̄ ∩ ω| ≥ t have been queried, A
wins the game if the signature σ ∗ is valid.
If there is no such polynomial-time adversary A that can forge a valid signature in the game described above, we say this scheme is secure against existential
forgery under chosen message attacks.
It is worth noting that this model also guarantees collusion resistance. This is
because if a group of signers can cooperate to construct a signature that none of
them could individually produce, then they can build another adversary which
can forge a valid signature to win the above game.
Attribute privacy.
In an attribute-based signature scheme, a legitimate signer is indistinguishable
among all the users whose attributes satisfying the predicate specified in the
signature. The signature reveals nothing about the identity or attributes of the
signer beyond what is explicitly revealed by the claim being made.
It can be defined using a game between an adversary and a challenger.
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The adversary A even knows the master secret key. So he could generate all
signer’s private keys as well as public keys. Its goal is to distinguish between two
signers which one generates the valid signature of a message with a predicate
such that both of their attributes satisfy the predicate.
Firstly, challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to get the master secret key
and the public parameters params. Then, C sends params as well as the master
secret key to adversary A. A can access polynomially bounded number of H1
and H3 oracles which are the same as described in the previous game. A can
generate private keys and signatures itself, because he has got the master secret
key.
Challenge: A outputs a message m∗ , two attribute sets ω0∗ , ω1∗ , and challenged
attribute set ω ∗ for signature query, where ω ∗ ⊆ ω0∗ ∩ ω1∗ . C chooses b ∈ {0, 1},
computes the challenge signature σ ∗ on behalf of the signer who possesses attribute set ω ∗ selected from ωb∗ and provides σ ∗ to A.
Guess: A tries to guess which attribute set between ω0∗ and ω1∗ is used to generate
the challenge signature σ ∗ . Finally, A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} and wins the
game if b0 = b.
If there is no such polynomial-time adversary A that can win the game
described above, we say this scheme holds attribute privacy property.
It is worth noting that this property holds even for the attribute authority,
because the master secret key is also given to the adversary.
4.4

Security analysis

Theorem 1. This attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme is
correct.
Proof. The correctness of this scheme can be proven by straight-forward substitutions.
t
u
Theorem 2. This attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model,
under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard.
Proof. Assume there is an algorithm A that can forge a valid signature under
chosen message attacks. There will be another algorithm B that can run the
algorithm A as a subroutine to solve the CDH problem.
We assume that the instance of the CDH problem consists of group elements
(g, g x , g y ) ∈ G31 , and our goal is to compute an element g xy ∈ G1 .
Setup: Let the default attribute set be Ω = {Ω1 , Ω2 , · · · , Ωd−1 }. Since the
threshold in our scheme is flexible from 1 to d, without loss of generality, we fix
the threshold to t ≤ d in this proof. Firstly, B selects randomly a subset Ω 0 ⊆ Ω
with |Ω 0 | = d − t. B selects g as the generator of G1 , and sets g1 = g x and
g2 = g y .
H1 Queries: B creates and keeps one list H1 -List to simulate H1 Oracle. This
list is used to store tuples like (i, αi , H1 (i)).
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Upon receiving an H1 hash query with respect to an attribute i, if this i
is not included in this H1 -List and i ∈ ω̄ ∪ Ω 0 , B randomly selects a number
αi ∈ Z∗q and returns H1 (i) = g αi as the H1 hash value of this i. Then, B records
the tuple (i, αi , g αi ) in this H1 -List. If this i is not included in this H1 -List and
i∈
/ (ω̄ ∪ Ω 0 ), B randomly selects a number αi ∈ Z∗q and returns H1 (i) = g1−αi as
the H1 hash value of this i. Then, B records the tuple (i, αi , g1−αi ) in this H1 -List.
If the i is already in a record in this H1 -List, B only returns the corresponding
H1 (i) in the record as the H1 hash value.
H3 Queries: B creates and keeps one list H3 -List to simulate H3 Oracle. This
list is used to store tuples like

(r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ), β, H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ) .
Part of the records in this H3 -List corresponding to the queries which are
queried by the adversary A. We will discuss this situation soon. The other part
of the records in this H3 -List corresponding to the queries which are conducted
by the simulator B when B responds to the Sign queries. We will postpone to
discuss this situation in the Sign Queries.
Upon receiving the k-th H3 hash query which is conducted by the adversary A with respect to a tuple (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )k , if this tuple is not included in this H3 -List, B randomly selects a number βk ∈ Z∗q and returns
H3 ((r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )k ) = g βk as the H3 hash value of this tuple. Then,
B records ((r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )k , βk , g βk ) in this H3 -List. If the tuple is
already in a record in this H3 -List, B only returns the corresponding H3 ((r,
{σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )k ) in the record as the H3 hash value.
Extract Queries: A can make requests for private keys of attribute set ω
such that |ω̄ ∩ ω| < t. First define three sets Γ, Γ 0 , S in the following manner:
Γ = (ω ∩ ω̄) ∪ Ω 0 , Γ 0 such that Γ ⊆ Γ 0 ⊆ S and |Γ 0 | = d − 1, and S = Γ 0 ∪ {0}.
Similar to the case in the normal scheme, B should randomly choose a (d − 1)
degree polynomial q(z) such that q(0) = x. We will show how B simulate private
keys for attribute sets although B does not know exactly the value of x.
For i ∈ Γ 0 , B randomly selects two numbers τi , ri ∈ Z∗p . In this case, B
assumes the value q(i) corresponding to this i of the randomly chosen (d − 1)
degree polynomial q(z) is q(i) = τi . Then, B can compute Di for i ∈ Γ 0 as
follows:
q(i)
Di = (g2 · H1 (i)ri , g ri ) = (g2τi · H1 (i)ri , g ri )
For i ∈
/ Γ 0 , B looks up the H1 -List which is created by H1 Oracle to find
the record about attribute i and get the corresponding αi . B randomly selects a
number ri0 ∈ Z∗p , and let
∆0,S (i)
ri =
y + ri0
αi
We will show how B simulate private keys for attribute i ∈
/ Γ 0 although B
does not know exactly the value of y. In case of the values q(i) for i ∈ Γ 0 are
determined in the previous stage, B can compute the value q(i) corresponding to
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i∈
/ Γ 0 of the randomly chosen (d − 1) degree polynomial q(z) by using Lagrange
interpolation as
X
q(i) =
∆j,S (i) · q(j) + ∆0,S (i) · q(0)
j∈Γ 0

in which q(0) = x. Then, B can compute Di for i ∈
/ Γ 0 as follows:
q(i)

Di = (g2

P

= (g2

· H1 (i)ri , g ri )

j∈Γ 0

∆j,S (i)·q(j)

0

∆0,S (i)
αi

· (g1−αi )ri , g2

0

· g ri )

although B does not know exactly the value of x and y.
B returns Di for each i ∈ (ω ∪ Ω) as the private key of ω.
Sign Queries: For a Sign query on message m with respect to an attribute set
ω. If |ω̄ ∩ ω| < t, B can get a simulated private key with respect to ω by querying
the Extract Oracle, and compute a signature on message m with respect to ω
normally.
If |ω̄ ∩ ω| ≥ t, B selects a t-element subset ω 0 ⊆ ω̄ ∩ ω and selects randomly
an element j from subset ω̄/ω 0 , and simulates the signature as follows:
Firstly, B selects a random (d−t)-element subset Ω 0 from Ω. Then, B chooses
two random numbers ri and ri00 for each i ∈ ω 0 ∪ Ω 0 , and let ri0 = ri · ∆i,S (0) + ri00 .
It is obviously that ri0 is still a random number for each i ∈ ω 0 ∪ Ω 0 . B also
chooses random number ri0 for each i ∈ ω̄/(ω 0 ∪ j). B also chooses two random
values βh , s0 ∈ Z∗p and let s = β1h y + s0 which is also a random number because
βh and s0 are randomly chosen. We will show how B simulate a correct signature
although B does not know exactly the value of y.
Firstly, B computes every part except for σ0 by using previous parameters
0
as in the normal scheme, and inserts a record ((r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω
hQ )/j , σj ),
i
−βh
x
ri0
βh , g1 ) in the H3 -List. Then, B computes σ0 = g2 ·
·
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j H1 (i)
αj
h
i
0
Q
0
β
ri0
H1 (j)s · H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj )s = g1−βh s · (g2 h · g αj s ) ·
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j H1 (i)
We will show this simulated σ0 have the same form as in the normal scheme
as follows:


Y
0
σ0 = g2x · 
H1 (i)ri  · (H1 (j) · H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ))s
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j

=

Y
i∈ω 0 ∪Ω 0

q(i)

(g2

· H1 (i)ri )∆i,S (0) ·

Y
i∈ω 0 ∪Ω 0

·(H1 (j) · H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ))

00

H1 (i)ri ·

Y

0

H1 (i)ri

i∈ω̄/(ω 0 ∪j)

s

Compared with a signature generated from the normal scheme, we will find
out that this simulated signature can be regarded as a normal signature which
q(i)
is generated by a signer who possesses private keys Di = (g2 · H1 (i)ri , g ri ) for
0
0
attribute i ∈ ω ∪ Ω in which q(z) is a random (d − 1) degree polynomial such
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that q(0) = x. It is worth noting that although ri00 and ri0 are not the same form
at the first glance, they are indeed the same form because both of ri00 and ri0 are
Q
Q
00
0
random numbers. So the two parts i∈ω0 ∪Ω 0 H1 (i)ri and i∈ω̄/(ω0 ∪j) H1 (i)ri
Q
0
can be merged into one part as i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j H1 (i)ri in the normal scheme.
Verify: While |ω̄ ∩ ω| < t, the simulated signature on message m with respect
to ω is computed by querying the Extract Oracle to get a simulated private key
with respect to ω normally. It will certainly pass the normal verification process.
While |ω̄ ∩ ω| ≥ t, we can check that the simulated signature can also pass the
normal verification process by straight-forward substitutions.
Finally, The adversary outputs a forged signature σ ∗ on message m∗ for
attribute set ω ∗ such that |ω̄ ∩ ω ∗ | ≥ t. It satisfies the verification equation,
which means that


Y
0
σ ∗ = {r∗ , g2x · 
H1 (i)ri  · H1 (j)s · H3 (r∗ , {σi∗ }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj∗ )s ,
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j
0

{g ri }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , g s }.
Then, B can compute
σ0∗
∗
αi ·
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j (σi )

Q

(σj∗ )αj · (σj∗ )βk

= g xy .

So, B can solve an CDH problem if A is able to forge valid signatures.
If there is no such polynomial-time adversary that can forge a valid attributebased signature with a predicate that his attributes do not satisfy, we say that
this attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme is secure against
existential forgery under chosen message attacks.
t
u
Theorem 3. This attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme is
equipped with the attribute privacy property in the random oracle model.
Proof. Setup: First, a (d − 1) default attribute set from Z∗p is given as Ω =
{Ω1 , Ω2 , · · · , Ωd−1 } for some predefined integer d. C selects a random generator
g ∈ G1 , a random x ∈ Z∗p as the master secret key, and set g1 = g x . Next, C
picks a random element g2 ∈ G1 . C sends these public parameters params as
well as the master secret key x to adversary A.
Both of the H1 oracle and H3 oracle are the same as described in Theorem
2.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two attribute sets ω0∗ and ω1∗ . Both the
adversary A and the challenger C can generate secret keys corresponding to
these two attribute sets as Di0 for i ∈ ω0∗ ∪ Ω and Di1 for i ∈ ω1∗ ∪ Ω respectively.
Then, the adversary outputs a message m∗ and a t-element challenge attribute
subset ω ∗ ⊆ ω0∗ ∩ω1∗ . The adversary A asks the challenger to generate a signature
on message m∗ with respect to ω ∗ from either ω0∗ or ω1∗ . The challenger C chooses
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, a (d−t)-element subset Ω 0 ⊆ Ω, and outputs a signature
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σ ∗ = {r∗ , σ0∗ , {σi∗ }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj∗ } by running algorithm which is described as the
Sign oracle in Theorem 2 using the secret key Dib for i ∈ ωb∗ ∪ Ω.
As we have mentioned in Theorem 2, part of the signature σ0∗ can be written
as
Q
Q
00 Q
0
q(i)
· H1 (i)ri )∆i,S (0) · i∈ω∗ ∪Ω 0 H1 (i)ri · i∈ω̄/(ω∗ ∪j) H1 (i)ri · (H1 (j) ·
i∈ω ∗ ∪Ω 0 (g2
H3 (r, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ))s , σi for i ∈ ω ∗ ∪ Ω 0 can be written as σi = (g ri )∆i,S (0) ·
00
00
0
g ri = g ri ·∆i,S (0)+ri = g ri .
So, the challenge signature can be regarded as generated by a signer who
q(i)
possesses private keys Di = (g2 · H1 (i)ri , g ri ) for attributes i ∈ ω ∗ ∪ Ω 0 in
which q(z) is a random (d − 1) degree polynomial such that q(0) = x. Thus, if
this challenge signature is generated by using the secret key Di0 for i ∈ ω0∗ ∪ Ω, it
can also be generated by using the secret key Di1 for i ∈ ω1∗ ∪ Ω since the secret
key Di1 for i ∈ ω1∗ ∪ Ω also satisfy the situation mentioned above. Similarly, if
this challenge signature is generated by using the secret key Di1 for i ∈ ω1∗ ∪ Ω,
it can also be generated by using the secret key Di0 for i ∈ ω0∗ ∪ Ω.
Therefore, even the adversary has access to the master secret key and has
unbounded computation ability, he cannot distinguish between two signers which
one generates a valid signature of a message with a predicate such that both of
their attributes satisfy the predicate.
t
u

5

Extended Scheme

In order to deal with messages which are larger than k2 , we can extend the
previous scheme as follows.
Setup: The Setup algorithm is same as in the previous scheme.
Extract: The Extract algorithm is also same as in the previous scheme.
Sign: Suppose one has private key for the attribute set ω. To sign a message m
which length is larger than k2 with predicate Υt,ω̄ (·), namely, to prove owning
at least t attributes among an n-element attribute set ω̄, he selects a t-element
subset ω 0 ⊆ ω ∩ ω̄ and selects randomly an element j from subset ω̄/ω 0 , and
proceeds as follows:
– First, separate the message m into two parts m = m1 ||m2 , and let the length
of m1 be k2 .
– Select a default attribute subset Ω 0 ⊆ Ω with |Ω 0 | = d − t and choose
(n + d − t − 1) random values ri0 ∈ Z∗p for i ∈ (ω̄/j) ∪ Ω 0 , choose a random
value s ∈ Z∗p ;
– Compute v = e(g1 , g2 );
– Compute f = F1 (m1 )||(F2 (F1 (m1 )) ⊕ m1 );
– Compute r = H2 (v) + f ;
– Compute c = H2 (r, m2 );
0
∆ (0)
– Compute σi = di1i,S · g ri for i ∈ ω 0 ∪ Ω 0 ;
0
– Compute σi = g ri for i ∈ ω̄/(ω 0 ∪ j);
s
– Compute σj = g ;
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i hQ
i
ri0
·
i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j H1 (i)
s
· H1 (j) · H3 (c, {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ) ;
– Finally, output the signature σ = (m2 , r, σ0 , {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj ).
– Compute σ0 =

hQ

i∈ω 0 ∪Ω 0

∆

di0i,S

(0)

Verify: To verify the validity of a signature σ = (m2 , r, σ0 , {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j ,
σj ) with threshold t for attributes ω̄, the verifier performs the following verification procedure to recover the message m1 :
e (g, σ0 )
 = v
i∈ω̄∪Ω 0 e (H1 (i), σi ) · e σj , H3 H2 (r, m2 ), {σi }i∈(ω̄∪Ω 0 )/j , σj

Q

r − H2 (v) = f.
Then, m1 = [f ]k2 ⊕ F2 ([f ]k1 ) is recovered from f . The verifier checks whether
the equation [f ]k1 = F1 (m1 ) holds. If it holds, output accept. Then the verifier
combines m = m1 ||m2 and the message m is recovered. Otherwise, output reject
to denote the signature is not valid.
In the above computation, the subscript k2 of f denotes the least significant
k2 bits of f , and the superscript k1 of f denotes the most significant k1 bits of
f.
Theorem 4. This extended attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme
is correct.
Proof. Correctness can be verified similarly with the above attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme in Theorem 1.
t
u
Theorem 5. This extended attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme
is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the random oracle
model, under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and therefore it is omitted.
t
u
Theorem 6. This extended attribute-based signature with message recovery scheme
is equipped with the attribute privacy property in the random oracle model.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and therefore it is omitted.
t
u

6

Conclusion

We proposed a new notion of attribute-based signature with message recovery, and presented two concrete attribute-based signature with message recovery schemes based on bilinear pairing that support flexible threshold predicates.
The first scheme allows the signer to embed the original message in the signature without the need of sending the original message to the verifier, while
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keeping the same signature size. The original message can be recovered from the
signature. Therefore, our first scheme minimizes the total length of the original message and the appended signature. The second scheme is extended from
the first scheme in order to deal with large messages. These schemes have been
proven to be existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks
in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard.
These schemes have also been proven to have the attribute privacy property.
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